Current opinion

Dating games

by  Bernard KENNEDY

The procession of key dates which epitomises Turkey-EU relations is to continue in 2005. Leaders of Turkish public opinion enthused about the EU Council’s conclusions in December although (or because) there was little to enthuse about. The commitment of public opinion to an open-ended accession process has persisted. Fresh traumas can be expected to put this commitment to the test in the years to come. But at the same time December 17 has made the process part of the furniture: the ball will keep rolling unless somebody stops it.

Turkey-EU ties were characterised in 2004 by a succession of climactic appointments with time. The most memorable are the Cypriot referenda of April 23, the 'Progress Report' of October 6 and finally the December 17 summit of EU heads of states and government. Previous years have followed a similar pattern, perhaps helping to explain the popularity of chronologies in press coverage of the 45 year-old relationship. For 2005, October 3 has been set as the nominal date for the start of accession talks - and the de facto deadline for Ankara to accept the Greek Cypriot administration as a customs union partner. News agencies are already filling out the calendar with the dates of other important meetings, the release schedules for the next reports and programmes, the countdowns to the Cypriot presidential elections and the steps to be taken by Turkish political, trade and judicial authorities.

Damaging debate

The December 17 celebrations were a little artificial - not so much a spontaneous outburst of joy as a deliberate morale-booster for a prime minister liable to meet with some cynicism on his return home from Brussels. This was only to be expected. The debates sweeping the core EU countries over the past 2-3 months have done little to alter Turkish perceptions of the EU as an exclusive club which seeks to keep Ankara at arm's length, exerting control and tapping into strategic assets without making economic commitments or cultural concessions.

The human rights smoke-screen rose (perhaps temporarily), and the debate within the EU was played out on a more convincing level of cultural fears, concerns for jobs and potential financial burdens. Turkey's uncertain public image in the north and west of the continent was verified repeatedly, and some significant politicians clearly signalled their determination to go on pouring fuel on sensitive issues and to ensure that Turkish membership remains an open question.

Stringent conditions

The conclusions of the EU Council were little more encouraging. After a polite grandmaster-level game of diplomatic chess among the EU capitals - marred only by some shouting on the part of the Turks and Greek Cypriots - the Council delayed the start of negotiations until the final quarter of 2005 (at the earliest). In line with the EU Commission's October recommendation, democracy will continue to be monitored closely, and talks may be suspended. Benchmarks to be set for the commencement of talks in each individual area may include track records of implementation and pave the way for a painful long drawn-out process with individual governments wielding effective veto rights.

In addition, the leaders (or at least some of them) felt the need not only to emphasise that the talks will be "open-ended" but also to refer to a goal of keeping Turkey "anchored" to the EU if they fail. Presumably this is also intended to apply if any EU country rejects their outcome in a referendum.

"Specific arrangements"

If Turkey is to become a member, it will not be before 2014, and may be put back further depending on the EU's absorption capacity. Going well beyond the Commission's caveats, the Council also made clear that upon membership Turkey could anticipate "long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses" in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture - that is, areas where Turkish citizens might once have hoped to derive some advantage from membership. Individual states are to play a maximum role when it comes to freedom of movement of persons. Against this, Ankara scored a diplomatic success (!) by having "permanent safeguard clauses" more carefully defined – it is the clauses, not the safeguards, which are to be permanent.

Arguably the basic conditions for membership remain the same as those which apply and have applied to other candidate countries. But in this case the EU Council has chosen to make all its caveats explicit. The procedures to be followed, although presented as guidelines for all ongoing and future accession processes, are unquestionably Turkey-specific

Meanwhile, the inevitable Cyprus condition only confirms the common Turkish observation (not policy) that admitting Greek Cyprus into the EU has prevented a settlement on the island. Surprisingly, Erdogan and the Foreign Ministry still appear to harbour hopes that the great powers will threaten the Greek Cypriots with an independent Turkish Cypriot state and so oblige them to accept something less than administration of the whole island by the Republic of Cyprus, recognised by Turkey. Such hopes are unlikely to be shared by the general public.

Better than nothing

None of this, however, means that Turkish opinion is quietly hardening either against the government or against the EU. Since December 17, the opposition has garnered little political capital - even where its various voices have been heard - by denouncing the government's capitulations. As previously argued on these pages, influential and large parts of society believe their interests will be best served if Turkey treads the EU path, regardless of whether it leads to its logical conclusion.

The EU of Chirac, Schroeder and Schlussel – or of Berlusconi, Blair, Barnier and Balkanende - is a poor substitute for the idealised civilisation of which Turkey sees itself as a rightful member. But it is the only show in town, and for the time being it seems better than nothing. To believe so is not to trust in the outcome. Even though Turkey now has a date, it will come as no surprise if the next batch of opinion polls shows that the average Turkish citizen wants to join the EU as much as ever before, but still never expects it to happen.

Reality check?

Will this faithless support of the Turkish public persist indefinitely? Certainly it will face stricter tests. Turks have to confront painful revisions of their cherished positions not only on Cyprus – where the revisionism is already well under way - but on minority rights, the Aegean, trade with Armenia and other issues. The EU’s selective approach to democracy, with its emphasis on ethnicity rather than equality, will continue to provoke antipathy. The education system may need to be overhauled, with implications both for vested interests and for national ideology.

Meanwhile, meat and used car imports, the liberalisation of services and the adoption of EU models for public tenders, incentive policies, the environment, health standards, packaging and much else besides will raise costs and increase competition for medium and small-scale businesses and the self-employed. The more Brussels is involved in Turkey’s governance in these ways, the greater the risk that it will come to be seen (as in many member states from time to time) as a cause of the country’s problems instead of a solution. Any downturn in the economy could also mark a downturn for perceptions of the EU.

The normalcy factor

Against these risks, the forces in favour of the process now wield the weapon of normalcy. The conclusions of December 17 have made membership talks between the EU and Turkey sound matter-of-fact. The inhabitants of western Europe can be expected to adjust their own inner normalities to reflect this new phenomenon, in the same way as they have accommodated kebab shops, mobile telephones, the euro or the homeless on their streets. In Turkey, likewise, the EU has arguably become an “ongoing situation” no longer worthy of general interest or debate. Only 30% of TV viewers reportedly watched Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s triumphant return from Brussels on December 18. The remainder were absorbed in the finale of the reality show “Can I Call You Mother?” – incidentally another dating game in which would-be brides, having crossed the boyfriend hurdle, struggle for the approval of their putative mothers-in-law.

(DIPLOMAT – January 2005 – Ankara)